This article uses cluster analysis to develop an early warning model of political change in the Levant as reflected in WEIS-coded event data generated from Reuters between April 1979 and December 1998. We employ a new statistical algorithm that uses the correlation between dyadic behaviors at two time points in time to identify clusters of political activity. The transition to a new cluster occurs when a point is closer in distance to subsequent points than to preceding points. These data clusters begin to "stretch" prior to breaking apart; this characteristic can be used as an early-warning indicator. The clusters identified by this technique correspond well with phases of political behavior identified a priori. A Monte-Carlo analysis shows that the clustering and early warning measures are not random; they perform very differently in simulated data sets with similar statistical characteristics. These results demonstrate that the statistical analysis of newswire reports can be used to provide systematic early warning indicators and provides empirical support for the theoretical concept of distinct behavioral "phases" in political activity. 
Introduction
In recent years, early warning has emerged as a major concern of national and international agencies that respond to political crises (Boutros-Ghali 1992; Davies and Gurr 1998; Dedring 1994; Esty et al. 1995 Esty et al. , 1998 Mizuno 1995; Schmeidl and Adelman 1998) , as well as a topic of renewed interest in the international relations literature (Gurr and Harff 1994, 1996; Rupesinghe and Kuroda 1992; Schmeidl, 1996) . The policy community has been inspired by the success of famine forecasting models that have enabled international agencies to reduce famine-related fatalities by several orders of magnitude over the past twenty years (Rashid 1998 , Whelan 1998 ).
Agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs would like to have comparable models for predicting other catastrophic situations-notably refugee flows-that require emergency humanitarian response.
Academics have contributed to these efforts, as evidenced by the collaboration between operational agencies and university-based researchers in the State Failures Project (Esty et al. 1995 (Esty et al. , 1998 and the Forum for Early Warning and Emergency Response (http://www.fewer.org); academic scholarship has also been motivated by sobering assessments of the failure of traditional forecasting methods to anticipate the end of the Cold War (Gaddis 1992) .
One of the central foci of event data research has long been the development of tools for the early warning of political change. Much of the initial impetus-and, quite critically, early funding-for event data research came from the United States Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). These efforts, including the Early Warning and Monitoring System (EWAMS), were contemporaneous with the creation of the World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) and Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) event coding frameworks as well as the development of a variety of systematic forecasting techniques (see Andriole and Hopple 1984; Choucri and Robinson 1979; Daly and Andriole 1980; Hopple, Andriole, and Freedy 1984; Hopple 1984; Laurance 1990; Phillips and Rimkunas 1983; Singer and Wallace 1979) .
For both institutional and pragmatic reasons, these initial efforts failed to take hold in the policy community (Laurance 1990) . By the mid-1980s, interest in, and funding of, statistical early warning projects had virtually ceased. The policy community continued to spend billions of dollars on analytical forecasts by intelligence agencies, but virtually all political prediction-as distinct from projecting economic and demographic trends-used traditional, rather than statistical, techniques.
Because human-coded event data were (and are) expensive to generate, the end of policyoriented event data research meant that the development of publicly-available event data collections declined dramatically and the academic community was limited to re-analyzing legacy collections whose coverage terminated around 1977. The WEIS data set-the centerpiece of the DARPA efforts-continued to be maintained through a variety of public and private efforts through the 1980s and 1990s (Tomlinson 1993) , but it was not widely available or used. In addition, several small, geographically-specific event data sets were created by scholars (for instance, Ashley 1980 and Van Wyk and Radloff 1993) .
Ironically, the emphasis on event-based early warning research ended at the same time that two technological changes rendered the approach more feasible. First, the revolution in electronic communications made available a vastly increased amount of news about political affairs than was utilized by previous analyses, which usually relied on a small number of elite Western newspapers. By the early 1990s, much of this information was available in machine-readable form, initially through commercial services such as NEXIS and Reuters Business Briefing, and now through the World Wide Web. Second, the exponential increase in the computational power available to scholars allowed for the use of statistical and coding techniques that were impossible during the earlier period of DARPA research.
The purpose of this article is to describe several new approaches to early warning that utilize contemporary technologies and concepts. The paper starts with a review of the methodological challenges involved in statistical early warning research. We then apply two clustering methods-one based on the distances between points, the other on the changes in the density of the cluster-to an event data set covering international behavior in the Levant-Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinians, and Syria, plus the United States and USSR/Russia-between April 1979 and December 1998. The Levant has long been regarded as an important example of an international subsystem (Binder 1958 , Gause 1999 ; the relatively large number of actors and varieties of behavior in the region provide for a robust test of any early warning techniques. Our analyses indicate that events tend to form temporally-delineated clusters and that the movement of points in those clusters can be used as an early warning indicator; this finding is consistent with the theories of "crisis phase" that underlie many qualitative approaches to early warning.
The clusters identified in our statistical analyses generally correspond to demarcations in the times series that we assigned a priori, based on a qualitative assessment of political changes in the region, and differ significantly from clusters found in a set of simulated data having similar statistical characteristics.
Statistical Approaches to Early Warning: A Review
In this section, we discuss some key differences between structural and dynamic models as applied to the early warning problem and describe the dynamic time series approach used in our research.
Structural and Dynamic Models
Statistical approaches to early warning can be classified into two broad categories: structural and dynamic. 1 The structural category includes studies that use events (or more typically, a specific category of events such as civil or international war) as dependent variables and explain these using a large number of exogenous independent variables. In the domain of domestic instability, this approach is exemplified by the work of Gurr and his associates, most recently in the "State Failure Project" [SFP] (Esty et al. 1995 (Esty et al. , 1998 . Gurr and Harff (1996) and Gurr and Lichbach (1986) describe a number of such research projects. In the field of international instability, the structural approach is illustrated by the work of Bueno de Mesquita, as well as by the Correlates of War project; Gochman and Sabrosky (1990) , Midlarsky (1993) , and Wayman and Diehl (1994) Goldstein and Freeman (1990) provide a book-length example of this approach; Dixon (1986) , Goldstein and Pevehouse (1997) , Goldstein et al. (2000) , Lebovic (1994) , Ward (1982) , and Ward and Rajmaira (1992) illustrate the continued development of this type of dynamic model.
Scholars defend the dynamic approach-which is at odds with most political science statistical modeling in using only lagged endogenous variables-in three ways. The first rationale is that many of the structural attributes that are theoretically important for determining the likelihood of conflict do not change quickly enough to be used as early warning indicators; in fact, many are virtually static (e.g., ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity, historical frequency of conflict, natural resource base). Data on variables that do change-for instance, unemployment rates, economic and population growth rates-are often reported only on an annual basis and the quality of these reports tends to be low in areas under political stress.
The second argument for the dynamic approach is that it allows for greater parsimony in the specification of the forecasting models than a structural approach. The first phase of SFP, for example, collected data on 75 independent variables (Esty et al. 1995, 9) . However, the final models developed in the project found that most of the forecasting power could be accounted for with only three variables: infant mortality, trade openness, and democracy (Esty et al. 1998, viii) . 2 In contrast, the event data collections used in dynamic models allow the researcher to monitor political interactions as reported in public media sources. The focus on events leads to models that contain a relatively small number of independent variables and the reliance on news sources allows the data to be collected systematically in real-time.
Finally, a dynamic modeling approach assumes that the exogenous variables incorporated in the structural models do not need to be explicitly included because their effects will be reflected in the pattern of events prior to a major change in the political system. In other words, the dynamic approach uses the lagged values of actual events as a substitute for structural variables, as illustrated in Figure 1 .
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To take a concrete illustration, Gurr (1995, 7) notes that "ethnic heterogeneity probably is most significant for state failure when it coincides with lack of democracy and low regime durability." Consequently, the SFP includes measures for those three variables: ethnolinguistic diversity, regime democracy, and regime durability. A dynamic approach, in contrast, would not measure these aspects of a political system directly, but would instead assume that each would be reflected in the types of events picked up by the international news media. The presence of democracy, for instance, would appear in the data not only in periodic reports of elections but in a large number of reports discussing disagreements between the government and the elected opposition. A low level of regime durability would result in coups and attempted coups. To the extent that ethnicity was an important political factor, one would find ethnically-oriented political rallies, outbreaks of violent ethnic conflict, and similar events. A suitably-designed event coding scheme should detect the presence or absence of these events and make the appropriate forecast without directly measuring the underlying variables.
At a theoretical level, therefore, dynamic modelers accept the importance of exogenous structural indicators: Ceteris paribus, countries with a high level of ethnic heterogeneity will have a greater propensity for conflict than those with a low level, democracies are likely to be different than autocracies, and so forth. The distinction between the two early warning strategies is one of measurement: structural modeling seeks to identify and measure the indicators directly, whereas the dynamic approach assumes we can indirectly incorporate the effects of structural attributes through the patterns of events they generate.
This is an optimistic, but not wholly implausible, assumption. For instance, in the Reutersbased domestic data with which we have been working, there is a clear contrast between Israel and Syria with respect to the presence of a democratic opposition. Similarly, the existence of ethnoreligious conflict in Lebanon is one of the most conspicuous features of the data set and is in sharp contrast to the relative lack of salience of such conflict in Jordan. Our argument is that an increase in democratization in Syria or a decline in ethnoreligious tensions in Lebanon would be reflected in the political events reported in Reuters, although we have not analyzed this
systematically.
An econometric analogy to the distinction between structural and dynamic political early warning is found in the differences between "technical" and "fundamental" approaches to the analysis of stock prices. A fundamental analysis attempts to predict price changes on the basis of underlying factors such as marketing, management, raw material prices, and macroeconomic trends. Technical analysis assumes that these factors will be reflected in changing stock prices; therefore analysis of patterns in the movement of those prices will provide sufficient information for forecasting. Fundamental analysis corresponds to the structural approach to modeling political events; technical analysis to the dynamic. Despite these complications, it should be noted that in two very important respects prediction is an easier problem than the typical econometric estimation problem. First, forecasting models have right-and-wrong answers, or at least their accuracy can be evaluated probabilistically. Coefficient estimation problems, in contrast, do not have answers: One can always specify an error structure, prior probability, or alternative model structure that places the estimated emphasis on different variables and there is no empirical method of deciding between these specifications. Second, and closely related to the first issue, forecasting problems are not affected by collinearity, which is the bane of coefficient estimation in the social sciences because every behavior tends to be linked to every other behavior. Coefficient estimates with low standard errors are clearly useful for obtaining a theoretical understanding of a situation, but they are not essential for the pragmatic purposes of forecasting (Wonnacott and Wonnacott 1979, 81) .
For this reason, it is not surprising that models with very diffuse coefficient structures that do not clearly identify the importance of specific variables-for example, neural networks, hidden
Markov models, and vector auto-regression (VAR)-are found increasingly in early warning research.
Crisis Phase and Prediction
The concept of "crisis phases" is found frequently in the early warning and preventive diplomacy literatures; recent discussions of the approach include Alker et al. (n.d.) , Carnegie
Commission for Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997), Gurr and Harff (1994), and Lund (1996) . In the empirical literature, crisis phase has been coded explicitly in collections such as the Butterworth international dispute resolution data set (Butterworth 1976 ), Moulton's (1989, 1997 ) "Computer-Aided System for Analyzing Conflicts" (CASCON;
http://web.mit.edu/cascon/) and SHERFACS, developed by Frank Sherman. In a review of these collections, Sherman and Neack explain that:
conflict is seen "as a sequence of phases." Movement from phase to phase in a conflict occurs as "the factors interact in such a way as to push the conflict ultimately across a series of thresholds toward or away from violence" (Bloomfield and Leiss 1969) .
Characteristics of disputes can be visualized as the timing and sequencing of movement between and among phases. Processes of escalation of violence, resolution or amelioration of the seriousness (threat of violence-hostilities) and settlement are identifiable through the use of phase structures. (Sherman and Neack 1993, 90) CASCON and SHERFACS, for instance, both code six phases: "dispute," "conflict,"
"hostilities," "post-hostilities conflict," post-hostilities dispute," and "settlement." A close analog to this approach is found in the DARPA-sponsored work of Phillips and Rimkunas (1983, 181-213) , which analyzes WEIS data in a two-dimensional space of "threat" and "uncertainty" using Thom's (1975) "cusp catastrophe" model. Their study successfully locates eight of eighteen crises identified in the WEIS data and produces no false positives.
If the concept of crisis phase is valid, the international behaviors observed should fall into distinct patterns over time. capture the behaviors characterizing a phase typology, it should be possible to determine those phases using statistical clustering. A cluster will occur whenever there is an extended period when the actors in the system are responding to each other in a consistent fashion (that is, repeating approximately the same types of actions-cooperative, conflictual, or absent-month after month). When the behavior of the dyads changes-for example, from peace to war or vice versa-the system shifts to a new cluster. If the transitions between these phases are gradual, or if interactions that precede a phase shift are distinct from those found when the system is locked in a single phase, then those behavior patterns can be used for early warning of the transition.
A Cluster-Based Approach to Early Warning
To test whether behavioral phase shifts can be used to develop early warning indicators, we analyzed the dyadic behavior of the international actors in the Levant between April 1979 and December 1998 using data created from Reuters lead sentences obtained from the NEXIS and Reuters Business Briefing data services. We coded these leads into WEIS categories using the Kansas Event Data System (KEDS) machine-coding program Schrodt, Davis, and Weddle 1994) . We then transformed the individual WEIS-coded events into a monthly net cooperation score for each directed dyad-the actions from a specific source to a specific target-by converting every event to an intensity score using the numerical scale in Goldstein (1992) and totaling these numerical values for each of the directed dyads for each month. We examined all the dyads involving interactions among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinians, Syria, the United States, and the Soviet Union/Russia; this gives a total of 56 directed dyads with 237 monthly totals in each dyad. 4 Appendix A contains additional details on coding and measurement. where A, B, ..., H are the actors in the system and each pair of letters represents the total Goldstein-scaled net cooperation for a directed dyad aggregated over one month. The behavior of the system is simply the path that this vector traces over time in a high-dimensional space. In vector terminology, a "phase" is characterized by a region in the vector space where points cluster over time. If political behavior follows a phase typology, this would be evident by the system spending most of its time inside distinct clusters of behaviors that characterize the phases, with brief transitions between the clusters.
The benchmark we use in our empirical tests is a set of phases established a priori based on the dominant political interactions during each period. These phases, shown in Table 1, correspond to the interpretations of "area experts" and are consistent with our own fieldwork in the region. Our discussion of the results of the clustering and the early warning indicator will use these a priori clusters as a reference point.
The effectiveness of event-space clustering in early warning depends on whether some measurable characteristic of the behavior of the system changes prior to the phase transition. In some instances there are few if any precursors to a phase transition, either because of deliberate concealment by political actors or due to the lack of media interest, as in the examples of Chechnya and Somalia. 5 Our conjecture is that most political situations, however, go through a gradual deterioration (or improvement) of affairs over a period of a few weeks or months prior to a phase transition, rather than experiencing a sharp jump. Furthermore, because news-gathering organizations are usually rewarded for correctly anticipating political events, journalists who are present in the region, understand the local politics, and can get their stories past editors and onto the news wires are likely to report the behaviors they perceive to be pre-cursors to any political phase change.
This approach to early warning is similar to the "normal relations range" concept proposed by Edward Azar nearly 30 years ago:
Over a period of time any two nations establish between them an interaction range which they perceive as "normal." This normal relations range (NRR) is an interaction range ... which tends to incorporate most of the signals exchanged between that pair and is bound[ed] by two critical thresholds-an upper threshold and a lower threshold. The upper critical threshold is that level of hostility above which signals exhibited by either member of the interacting dyad are regarded as unacceptable to the other. Interaction above the present upper critical threshold ... for more than a very short time implies that a crisis situation has set in. (Azar 1972, 184) The NRR model implies that interactions will cluster, with the diameter of the cluster a function of the "upper critical threshold." Consistent with Azar's treatment, we expect that when the system is near the edge of a behavioral cluster, it is in a crisis situation. That crisis will either result in a shift to a new cluster-a phase transition-or be resolved without a transition, in which case the system's interactions will return to the core of the cluster. Unlike Azar, however, we assume the system is moving away from normal behavior when it consistently nears (or passes) the edge of a behavioral cluster, rather than when it exceeds a single critical threshold. We have generalized Azar's NRR concept by looking at changes in a large number of dyads simultaneously (whereas Azar looked only at one dyad at a time), and we use a standardized metric based on correlation, whereas Azar used a Euclidean metric and established distinct critical ranges for each dyad. Finally, we also look at the density of clusters-defined as the average distance between the points in a cluster-over time. Behavior within the NRR should result in dense clusters, whereas when a system moves away from one phase/cluster/NRR and into another there will generally be a period when the points do not cluster densely.
Detection of Phase using Clustering over Time
Most widely-used clustering algorithms are cross-sectional and do not incorporate the timeseries element of event data (see Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984; Bailey 1994; Everitt 1980) . A cross-sectional method will not necessarily produce credible time-series clusters: Because the Levantine subsystem as we have defined it does not include all relevant interactions-for example, the end of the Cold War-points that are distant in time may still bear a superficial resemblance to each other.
Including time as the dominant dimension actually simplifies the delineation of clusters. The new clustering algorithm we employ in this study is uncomplicated: a new cluster is established at a point x t when the distance between x t and the points before it is greater than the distance between x t and the points after it. This can be expressed in the equation:
"LML" is the "Lagged distance Minus Leading distance;" x t is the Goldstein-scaled net cooperation score for month t, ||x t -x t±k || is the distance between x t and x t±k according to some metric, and ∆ is a threshold parameter that prevents new clusters from being formed because of random fluctuations in the event data that are unrelated to phase transitions. 6 . (A large negative value of LML t means that the point is still firmly in the current cluster: It is much closer to paints in the past than to points in the future. When the LML t value is strongly positive, it indicates the point is far away from past points and close to future points.) From the perspective of cluster analysis, this approach is similar to the "minimum spanning tree" approach (see Backer 1995 , Chapter 1) in dividing the clusters at places where a large distance is found between adjacent points; it differs in using the dimension of time rather than a graph to determine which points are adjacent.
In our analysis, "k" is measured in months, although in principle it could represent some other interval of time: weeks or even days. The threshold ∆ is a free parameter whose value is dependent on the level of differentiation the analyst wants between the clusters (and the characteristics of the data being used to measure the political activity). For example, if ∆ were set to a very high value, such as 0.8, we would see only two clusters in the data: pre-Oslo and postOslo. If it were set to a low value such as 0.15, we would find several additional sub-clusters within the a priori clusters specified in Table 1 . • a pre-Lebanon change, probably reflecting increased tension between Israel and the PLO in 1981;
• two pre-Taba changes that may correspond to shifts in Israeli, Syrian, and U.S. policy in Lebanon (including extensive diplomatic activity related to the May 17, 1983 agreement and its subsequent abrogation);
• a transition in January 1993 that may reflect the change in U.S. policy towards the Middle East that occurred with the shift from the Bush to Clinton administrations.
Finally, the analysis identifies March 1997 as the end of the Oslo period. This is reasonable.
While the Netanyahu government came to power in the June-July 1996 period, it was nominally committed to continuing the Oslo peace process initially and the observed nine-month delay before the end of that process, while unanticipated, is in retrospect unremarkable.
Our LML measure misses two previously chosen transitions: the Kuwait war and the transition to the Madrid phase. Including the Kuwait transition as an a priori phase was probably an error. Although Iraq's invasion of the emirate and the subsequent war had profound implications for the Levant, the initial interactions characterizing this period came from actors outside the group we are studying, so it is not surprising that the data do not reflect it. It is less obvious why we fail to identify the subsequent Madrid transition. This might also be a sideeffect of the Kuwait invasion. Because much of the behavior during late 1990 and 1991 was due to circumstances outside of the immediate region, the very real shift in politics that accompanied the Madrid process may have been less apparent in the data than were the other transitions.
Change in Cluster Density as an Early Warning Indicator
The "Lagged distance Minus Leading distance" measure cannot be used for early warning: It requires information from both before and after a phase transition has occurred and therefore can only be used to delineate clusters of behavior retrospectively. Consequently, in order to develop an early warning indicator, some alternative measure is required. An examination of Figure 4 shows that the leads-minus-lags (LML) measure often begins a rapid increase several months before a phase transition occurs. This is consistent with the underlying theory of phase transitions: The changing interactions in the system cause the points to pull away from the cluster center before a final break occurs, rather like what happens when pulling on a piece of taffy. This pattern suggests that a decrease in the density of the cluster-the extent to which the points within the cluster are close to each other-might serve as an early warning indicator. Since a change in cluster density can be determined solely on the basis of information available up to and including time t, it can be identified prospectively. Figure 5 shows the behavior of such a "cluster density change" (CDC) measure. This measure is calculated by first computing the total distance between the points in a cluster of four consecutive months
||x t-i -x t-j || and then calculating the difference between CD t at points that are eight months apart:
The cluster density change measure generally corresponds well with both the a priori phases and LML-identified transitions, despite the fact that the LML clusters were based on post-hoc information. At each point where the CDC exceeds a threshold set at one standard deviation (0.23), there is a corresponding LML cluster transition within a few months of the point (see Table 2 ). Unlike the LML measure, the CDC analysis does identify the Madrid transition-it exceeds the 0.23 level in November 1991 (x t = 0.24) and December 1991 (x t = 0.27)-but still fails to show the Kuwait transition, which arguably occurred due to factors exogenous to the system. A peak in the CDC measure in October 1989 (x t = 0.24) probably corresponds to the decline of reports of activity in the Palestinian intifada (Gerner and Schrodt 1998) ; the peaks in early 1995 and 1996 may reflect changes associated with the problems encountered in the Oslo peace process prior to the cluster break identified in March 1997.
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The CDC measure is continuous and can be interpreted as being proportional to the probability of a major change occurring, rather than only providing a yes/no prediction of change, as was done in most of the event data models developed in the 1970s. From the perspective of early warning analysis, the disadvantage of CDC is that the measure indicates only that some sort of systemic shift is going to occur; it tells nothing about what form that change will take.
Furthermore, the phases determined by CDC do not necessarily correspond to the overt militarypolitical changes that one might wish to forecast with an early-warning system. This is most conspicuously the case for Lebanon in 1981-82. According to the CDC measure, the system shifted into the "Lebanon" phase about a year before the Israeli invasion in June 1982.
When the invasion actually occurs, the CDC measure is at one of the lowest points seen in the entire time series. On the one hand, the Israeli policies that culminated in the invasion of Lebanon were put into effect well before the invasion, so placing the true phase shift in mid-1981 is politically plausible. It is widely accepted that Israel planned the invasion of Lebanon as much as a year in advance, then engaged in provocative military maneuvers throughout the first half of 1982 in an effort to goad the Palestinians into a response that would justify Israeli military intervention (Gerner 1994; Hiro 1992; Jansen 1982; Petran 1987; Randel 1983; Reilly 1983 ). On the other hand, the situation on the ground looked very different in July 1982 than in April 1982, a period during which the CDC measure plummeted. CDC is clearly not a "barometric" early warning indicator that allows a political analyst to say to his boss, "The CDC indicators are real low this month, ma'am:
nothing to worry about ..." This may be because CDC is based on a correlation distance and is sensitive to changes in the configurations of policies-who is coordinating policy with whom-rather than to the direction of change. Using CDC as an early warning indicator in combination with a Euclidean measure sensitive to the direction of change might provide both types of information.
Our research generally supports the crisis phase model, but the measures are somewhat ad hoc.
How do we know our findings are nothing more than a statistical artifact, reflecting a combination of chance and self-deception? In Appendix B we compare our results to those obtained with a randomly-generated simulated data set that has the same mean, variance, and autocorrelation as the observed data. The Monte-Carlo analysis of the LML and CDC measures found that these two indicators behave quite differently in the randomly-generated simulated data sets than in the observed data. This suggests our results are due to actual political characteristics in the region rather than simply an artifact of the clustering methods. Table 2 summarizes the empirically determined clusters in Levantine political behavior for the period that we have studied. For the most part, these divisions correspond to our a priori clusters; when they do not, the differences are plausible. The LML cluster analysis identifies two phases that were not part of the a priori set. The first is an increase in tension between Israel and the PLO prior to the Lebanon invasion; the second is a post-invasion, pre-Taba period corresponding to continuing instability and the Israeli withdrawal from the area around Beirut. The end of the Oslo phase occurs about nine months into the Netanyahu administration; while we did not anticipate this particular date, it is quite plausible. Only after another year had passed did the contrary and disastrous design of Defense Minister Ariel Sharon prevail.
Summary of Findings

Conclusion
With the end of the DARPA-sponsored early warning research, the development of quantitative early warning models went into eclipse. This is understandable. When evaluated against what is possible today, the DARPA efforts were necessarily primitive in their dependence on time-consuming and unreliable human coding and on mainframe computers that has only a tiny fraction of the speed and memory now available in a contemporary desktop machine. The event-based quantitative forecasting efforts of the late 1970s were unsuccessful, but then 1970s video games were not very impressive either.
The contemporary situation is quite different. The quantity, consistency and timeliness of event data have improved substantially due to the advent of machine-coded event data sets based on news wire sources. With increased computer power, and the greater sophistication of statistical research in international relations, a variety of new early warning techniques can now be applied to that data.
We draw two general conclusions from our analysis using time-delimited clusters. First, our empirical results support both the theoretical concept of crisis phases and the strategy of analyzing those phases by looking at the movement of a point defined by the vector of dyadic interactions in an international system. The pattern of variation in LML t seen in Figure 4 is exactly what we expected the phase transition model to generate: brief periods of large movement followed by long periods of little movement.
These time-delineated clusters are much cleaner and consistent than clusters determined by the cross-sectional techniques such as the K-Means analysis found in Schrodt and Gerner (1997) .
The LML t >∆ method used to delineate the clusters is conceptually straightforward and computationally efficient; in fact, the algorithm is sufficiently simple that it may be possible to determine analytically some of its statistical properties. Nonetheless, it locates most of the clusters we expected to find.
The CDC measure also appears promising as the basis of an early-warning indicator. The measure provides a two to six month warning for most of the changes in our data set and its behavior is consistent with the theoretical predictions of the crisis phase approach. Both the LML t and the CDC measures act quite differently in data generated from real-world events than in simulated data, which suggests that they are reflecting underlying political behavior rather than statistical artifacts.
Time-delimited clusters are a dynamic rather than a structural early warning approach, but their effectiveness should not be regarded as evidence against the structural approach; we regard these two research strategies as complementary rather than competitive. Structural methods are particularly good for mid-level warning: telling analysts where to look for potential trouble.
Structural methods are also more likely to provide theoretical guidance about why a specific system is likely to experience problems. This might provide insights into the types of actions that could be taken to ameliorate an impending crisis. Structural models are unlikely to excel at predicting the exact timing of breakdowns, however, because the variables that they have identified as theoretically important change much too slowly. This is where dynamic models come into play.
In this analysis we have not considered an alternative class of dynamic models-those based on event sequences, rules, patterns, and precedents (see Cimbala 1987; Hudson 1991 ). These models generally provide a greater amount of contextual information than is supplied by the numerical time-series methods. As a consequence, they, too, may be useful in identifying the immediate events leading to a crisis. For instance, while the Kuwait transition is invisible in our cluster analysis, the events preceding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait follow Lebow's (1981) "Justification of Hostility" crisis-type very closely. Recognizing such patterns could be used for very short-term forecasting. An assortment of computationally-intensive non-linear forecasting techniques methods have also been developed in recent years (e.g. Casdagli and Eubank 1992;
Richards 2000), although relatively little attention has been paid to these in the quantitative international politics literature. In short, there are still a variety of unexplored techniques that could be applied to the early warning problem.
We suspect that the ideal early warning model would combine elements of both the structural and dynamic approaches. The optimal early warning model, for example, might vary depending on the structural precursors found in a specific case. Presumably the internal breakdown in a country such as Lebanon-which is relatively wealthy and highly differentiated by religion-occurs in a different fashion than a breakdown in Rwanda, which is relatively poor and not differentiated by religion. The literature on domestic conflict and state breakdowns (for example Esty et al. 1995 , Gurr and Lichbach 1986 could provide theoretical guidance on this issue.
The reason that such integrated models have not been developed to date is largely one of resources: the political science discipline is still developing accurate structural and dynamic models and at present no researcher has been able to assemble data sets sufficiently large to study structural and dynamic dimensions simultaneously. As the investigation of both types of models identifies more focused sets of variables and techniques, it should be practical to combine the approaches.
Appendix A Data Sources and Measurement
Our source for the period 15 April 79 to 10 June 97 was the NEXIS "REUNA" file; Reuters
Business Briefing (RBB) was used for the period 11 June 97 to 31 December 98. The change of sources was required because Reuters stopped supplying data to NEXIS on 10 June 97. The two data services provide a somewhat different mix of stories but we see no evidence of a significant discontinuity when the stories are coded and aggregated at a monthly level.
The following search command was used to identify relevant stories in NEXIS: To locate stories in RBB, we utilized the RBB search software (version 2.0 for Macintosh) to select "Political" and "General" news stories that dealt with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria; the "Reuters Sports" source was explicitly excluded. (The "Israel" category includes stories on the Palestine National Authority as well as Israel.) Some additional filtering was done on both the NEXIS and RBB downloads to eliminate Reuters "Highlights," historical calendars and other irrelevant material.
The KEDS machine coding program does some simple linguistic parsing of the news reports-for instance, it identifies the political actors, recognizes compound nouns and compound verb phrases, and determines the references of pronouns-and then employs a large set of verb patterns to determine the appropriate event code. Details on the mechanics of the KEDS system are found in Gerner et al. (1994) and Schrodt, Davis, and Weddle (1994) . Based on the dictionaries used by the KEDS program, the proper noun in the subject-"Arafat"
(or the adjective "Palestinian" )-is assigned the actor code PAL and becomes the source of the event. The proper noun in the direct object-"Netanyahu" (or the adjective "Israeli" )-is assigned the actor code ISR and becomes the target. The event is determined by the verb-"accused"-and is assigned the code 121 corresponding to the appropriate code in the WEIS event coding system. Bond et al. (1997) , Huxtable and Pevehouse (1996) , and Schrodt and Gerner (1994) discuss extensively the reliability and validity of event data generated using
Reuters and KEDS.
We coded only the lead sentences of the stories; this produced a total of 92,687 events. The search command generates a number of events that are outside the 56 directed dyads considered in this study. Those 56 dyads contain 43,328 events.
The data and the source code for the computer programs used in the analysis, as well as the KEDS program (version 0.9B6.2) and the dictionaries used for this coding session, are available from the web site http://www.ukans.edu/~keds (15 May 2000).
Appendix B Comparison with a Null Model
In this appendix, we develop a null model and look at the distribution of various indicators in simulated data generated by that model. We wish to determine whether a Monte Carlo analysis using randomly-generated data having the same means, variances, and autocorrelations as our Levant dyads will show the same patterns of change in distance that we found in the actual data.
If this occurs, it would mean our results are simply an artifact of the analytical method, rather a reflection of the underlying politics.
The null model that we use duplicates the sample size (192) and number of dyads (54) found in an earlier version of the data set, as well as the mean, variance, and first-order autocorrelation of the data within each dyad. 9 Specifically, we generated simulated data using a first-order autoregressive (AR[1]) process y t = c + φ y t-1 + ε where c = µ (1-ρ); φ = ρ; E(ε)=0; Var(ε) = s 2 (1-ρ 2 ). As Hamilton (1994, 53-54) notes, this will produce a time series with mean µ , variance s 2 , and first-order autocorrelation ρ. In order to avoid initial value effects, the simulated data were taken from the interval [y 51 , y 242 ] with y 0 =µ.
To save computation time, ε were generated by random selection from a table of 5000 normallydistributed random variables produced by Excel 4.0. We created a sample of 1000 such data sets.
This specification represents a compromise between a null model that is excessively random and one that duplicates all of the features of the original data set. For example, in a null model using white noise (no autocorrelation), points generated by the dyads would jump around in the vector space far more than one would ever expect to see in event data based on actual political behavior and presumably would show only very small clusters. On the other hand, if we also duplicated the cross-correlation between dyads, the simulated data set would have most of the statistical characteristics of the actual data and it would not be surprising if we found similar results. Our choice is an intermediate model in which the simulated time series have the same general characteristics within each dyad but have no relationship between dyads.
(Autocorrelation above the first order is significant in only a small number of the dyads in the original data.)
In comparing the simulated data with the actual data, we looked at the following measures:
• The total number of points where LML t >∆, with ∆=0.2, the threshold that best delineated clusters in this 1979-1996 data set.
• The number of LML t >∆ points that signal a new cluster: this is defined (somewhat arbitrarily) as an LML t >∆ point that had no LML t >∆ points in the previous two time periods. 10 These times are called "cluster-defining points."
• The standard deviation of LML t and the early warning measure CDC; the means of both measures are zero.
• The number of CDC measures greater than one standard deviation above zero at 0, 1, 2 and 3 months prior to a cluster-defining point.
• The number of LML t >∆ points within 0, 1 ,2 and 3 months of the six a priori cluster transitions we identified in our data set, as a proportion of the total number of LML t >∆ points.
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Because the CDC measure can only be computed after twelve months of data are available, and computing the LML t requires three additional months, the interval on which these measures were computed contains 192 -11 -3 = 178 time points.
The results of the Monte-Carlo analysis are presented in Table A1 , where the "one-tailed
proportion" indicates the proportion of the values in the simulated data that are less than (<) or greater than (>) the observed value. The distribution of the values of the statistics are generally smooth, symmetrical, and more or less normally distributed; the probabilities are based on the actual distributions of the statistics in the simulated data rather than on a normal approximation.
With the exception of one set of statistics-the relationship between CDC and the clusterdefining points-the values observed in the actual data are substantially different than those 27 found in the simulated data and vary in the expected direction. The number of LML t >∆ points found in the actual data, whether total or cluster-defining, is about half that found in the simulated data. The standard deviations of the LML and CDC measure are substantially less in the observed data than in the simulated data. Generally, an LML t >∆ point is about twice as likely to occur near one of the a priori cluster breaks in the actual data than in the simulated data.
TABLE A1 ABOUT HERE
The relationship between CDC and the cluster-defining points is somewhat puzzling. The observed k=0 point is significantly greater (at the 0.1 level) than the simulated values, as we expected. The k=1 value, however, is simply equal to the mean, and the k=2 and k=3 values are actually significantly less than the simulated data at the 0.15 level. This suggests that on average CDC t-k may actually be a better early warning indicator than demonstrated in this data set, although its performance is due to autocorrelation in the data rather than to any more complex political characteristics that involve dyadic interactions.
The large number of LML t >∆ points combined with standard deviations of LML and CDC that are higher in the simulated data than in the observed data suggests that the value of ∆-a free parameter that was established arbitrarily-may have been set too low for the simulated data.
We re-ran the simulated data sets with ∆=0.35, a level of ∆ that gives roughly the same number of cluster-defining points in the simulated data as were found in the observed data with ∆=0.2. This adjustment of ∆ effectively eliminates one additional degree of freedom in the simulated data; the results of this analysis are reported in Table A2 .
This modification changes the one-tailed probabilities somewhat, but in general does not alter the conclusions of the analysis. The curious pattern of CDC and the cluster-defining points is retained-and actually strengthened at k=2 and k=3-except that the k=0 point is no longer significant. The relationship between the LML t >∆ measures and the a priori breaks is slightly less strong, but the k>0 probabilities are still quite low. We conclude that the behavior of the predictive measures is not solely due to the difference in the number of LML t >∆ points. can match the number of empirically-determined clusters, but the behavior of the CDC statistic and the coincidence of LML>∆ points and the a priori points are still quite different in the simulated data. Furthermore, the necessity of raising the value of ∆ to match the expected number of clusters means that the number of points at which a large change occurs in LML t is greater in the simulated data than in the observed data because the variance of LML is higher in the simulated data. This in turn would be expected if the observed data actually settled into clusters and remained there for a period of time-as predicted by crisis phase theories-rather than jumping around. We suspect that the standard deviation of LML t is lower in the observed data because of cross-correlation (and in a few dyads, higher-order autocorrelation) of the dyads.
Footnotes
1 This discussion will not consider the large literature on non-statistical or qualitative approaches to forecasting: Contemporary surveys of these approaches can be found in Davies and Gurr (1998), Rupesinghe and Kuroda (1992) , and Schmeidl and Adelman (1998) . We also will not deal with long-range forecasting using computer simulation; Ward (1985) and Hughes (1993) summarize that literature.
2 Phase II of the SFP involves some limited analysis of dynamic variables, and suggests expanding this approach in future studies.
3 Until relatively recently, technical stock market analysis generally had a bad reputation, due to its use of statistically-dubious patterns based on small samples, wishful thinking, and gurus whose fortunes were based more on the sale of books than on trading stock. With the increase in computing power in the 1980s, the situation changed, and "programmed trading systems" can now process sufficiently large amounts of information to generate profits working solely with information endogenous to the market itself. The increased information processing capacity that exists today, in contrast to that available in the 1970s, may have a similar effect on the analysis of political behavior using event data. 4 We repeated some of our analyses without the USA→USSR and USSR→USA dyads; this change generated only minor differences in the results. (The events involving these dyads include only the USA-USSR interactions reported in the lead sentences of Reuters stories dealing with the Levant, not USA-USSR interactions in general.) 5 On the surface, the Rwanda genocide appears to be an ideal case where we would expect precursors to be absent. Yet in assessing this situation, Ruso (1996) observes that the appropriate facts were available (but incorrectly interpreted) as early the UN Rapporteur's Report in 1993 (Deqni-Ségui 1994). Ruso concludes:
[T]he authors answer "Yes" to the question, "Did those with the capacity to prevent and mitigate the genocide have the information from which such a conclusion might be drawn?"
In fact, they note that specific information about plans and conspiracies towards this end was picked up by the UN system, most significantly in the notorious "Black File" of January 1994. (Ruso 1996:8) 6 These calculations were done with a simple (600-line) Pascal program that produced various tab-delimited files there were read into Excel to produce the figures.
7 There are six possible comparisons within a cluster of four months-x t to x t-1 , x t to x t-2 , through x t-2 to x t-3 . Therefore the divisor six is used to compute the average. The lag of eight months was established empirically. In other regions of the world it might be shorter or longer depending on the time required for political decisions to be made. The choice of eight months is not critical. Because the CDC t calculation involves data from two periods of four consecutive months, values of CDC t at lags one or two months shorter or longer than the eight-month lag employed here will be strongly correlated with the eight-month value.
8 This cluster break occurs near the splice between the NEXIS and Reuters Business Briefing (RBB) sources: the "leading" cluster for March 1997 contains two-and-a-half months of NEXIS data and one-and-a-half months of RBB. While it is possible that the change in data sources affects the delineation of the cluster, this seems unlikely for three reasons. First, this cluster shift is consistent with the changing policies of the Netanyahu administration. Second, the cluster break is anticipated by four months in the CDC measurements that contain no RBB data.
Finally, most of the LML scores across the splice are quite low: Many are close to zero and only the March and April 1997 calculations show evidence of a shift in behavior. generated by rapid movements away from an existing cluster; these are quite common in the simulated data and are seen in the actual data in the Lebanon transition. This measure should also be less sensitive to the level of ∆.
11 In the simulated data, these a priori transitions are arbitrary because they were determined by changes in the actual, rather than the simulated, data. Nonetheless, these indicators measure the likelihood of finding LML t >∆ points in the vicinity of a set of six transition points spaced at the intervals in the a priori set. We look at the proportion because the number of LML t >∆ points in the simulated data is substantially higher than in the actual data. (1) The a priori cluster break was two months earlier, in June 1985 (2) This CDC score probably corresponds to the end of the intifada and the Syrian consolidation of power in Lebanon rather than a forecast of the Kuwait invasion (3) The a priori cluster break was almost a year earlier, in November 1991 (4) A break at some point during the Netanyahu government period was anticipated; the exact timing was not. Note to editors: Some of the labels in this figure printed poorly in MS-Word but are okay when the figure is printed directly from MS-Excel. We will produce the camera-ready versions from
Excel. The distances are computed using a correlation metric. Vertical lines correspond to the a priori phase transitions identified in the Table 1 . X-axis tick marks are 3-month intervals.
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